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ABSTRACT
Historically, the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) relied heavily on lightning 
avoidance to protect launch vehicles and crew from 
lightning effects. As NASA transitions from the 
Space Shuttle to the new Constellation family of 
launch vehicles and spacecraft, NASA engineers are 
imposing design and construction standards on the 
spacecraft and launch vehicles to withstand both the 
direct and indirect effects of lightning.
A review of  current  Space Shutt le l ightning 
constraints and protection methodology will be 
presented, as well as a historical review of Space 
Shuttle lightning requirements and design. The 
Space Shuttle lightning requirements document, 
NSTS 07636, Lightning Protection, Test and 
Analysis Requirements, (originally published as 
document number JSC 07636, Lightning Protection 
Criteria Document) was developed in response to 
the Apollo 12 lightning event and other experiences 
with NASA and the Department of Defense launch 
vehicles.[1] This document defined the lightning 
environment, vehicle protection requirements, and 
design guidelines for meeting the requirements.[2]
The cri teria developed in JSC 07636 were a 
precursor to the Society of Automotive Engineers 
(SAE) lightning standards. These SAE standards, 
along with Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics (RTCA) DO-160, Environmental 
Conditions and Test Procedures for Airborne 
Equipment, are the basis for the current 
Constellation lightning design requirements.[3] The 
development and derivation of these requirements 
will be presented. 
As budget and schedule constraints hampered 
lightning protection design and verification efforts, 
the Space Shuttle elements waived the design 
requirements [2] and relied on lightning avoidance in 
the form of launch commit criteria (LCC) constraints
[4] and a catenary wire system for l ightning 
protection at the launch pads. A better 
understanding of the lightning environment has 
highlighted the vulnerability of the protection 
schemes and associated risk to the vehicle, which 
has resulted in lost launch opportunities and 
increased expenditures in manpower to assess 
Space Shuttle vehicle health and safety after 
lightning events at the launch pad. 
Because of high-percentage launch availability and 
long-term on-pad requirements, LCC constraints are 
no longer considered feasible.[5] The Constellation 
vehicles must be designed to withstand direct and 
indirect effects of lightning. A review of the vehicle 
design and potential concerns will be presented as 
well as the new catenary lightning protection system 
for the launch pad. This system is required to protect 
the Constellation vehicles during launch processing 
when vehicle lightning effects protection might be 
comprom ised  by  such  i t ems as umbilical 
connections and open access hatches.
INTRODUCTION
On 14 November, 1969, at 11:22 am, Eastern 
Standard Time, the Apollo 12 mission launched from 
Launch Complex 39A at the Kennedy Space Center
(KSC), Florida.  At 36.5 seconds and again at 52
seconds into the flight, triggered lightning struck the 
Apollo Command and Service Module (CSM).[6]  
The lightning event disconnected all three CSM fuel 
cells from the main power bus.  A decrease in main 
bus voltage caused the primary signal condition 
equipment (SCE) to quit operating.  The crew was 
confronted with numerous caution and warning 
indications and fuel cell disconnect flags.  At 60 
seconds into the flight, flight controllers regained 
flight telemetry data.[7]
In order to gain some insight into the condition of the 
spacecraft, flight controller John Aaron, using 
experience with anomalous spacecraft telemetry 
gained during spacecraft testing at KSC, requested 
the crew switch the SCE to auxiliary.[8]  This allowed 
flight controllers to see that fuel cells were not 
connected to the main power bus.  The crew reset 
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2circuit breakers in the spacecraft, reconnecting the 
fuel cells to the main bus. Throughout the launch, 
the Saturn launch vehicle continued to operate 
normally. [7]
Prior to this incident, only the lightning effects on the 
spacecraft for  the per iod pr ior  to f l ight  were 
considered. The possibility of the spacecraft and 
launch vehicle being struck by lightning after lift-off 
was not a launch consideration unless natural 
lightning activity was present in the launch complex
area. [6]
The corrective actions from the Apollo 12 event 
analysis included launch restrictions that would 
minimize the risk of triggered lightning. [6] The
launch commit criteria (LCC) recommended in the 
Apollo 12 analysis resemble the current LCC’s used 
by the Space Shuttle Program. [9]
REVIEW OF LAUNCH COMMIT CRITERIA
NSTS 16007, “Shuttle Launch Commit Criteria and 
Background Document,” contains the Space Shuttle 
LCC’s.  The purpose of the LCC’s is to document 
pre-planned decisions with a goal of reducing the 
amount of real-time rationalization needed to take 
place during off-nominal launch conditions.  This is 
done to support Shuttle mission objectives while 
maintaining optimum vehicle and crew safety along 
with maximizing launch probability. [4]
D u e  t o the Shuttle’s deficiencies in l ighting 
protection, LCC’s were developed to protect the 
Shuttle from the direct and indirect effects of 
lightning through avoidance of the phenomenon.  
These launch restrictions are contained in section 4 
of the NSTS 16007 document and consist of eight 
rules to avoid natural and triggered lightning.  The 
eight rules with a short description are as follows:  
1) Lightning – The lightning rule prevents the 
Shuttle from launching within 30 minutes of 
the most recent natural lightning strike near 
the launch site.  
2) Cumulus Clouds – The Cumulus Clouds rule 
prevents the Shuttle from launching if the 
projected flight path is through or near a 
cumulus cloud, depending on the size and 
temperature of the cloud.
3) Anvil Clouds – The Anvil Clouds rule 
prevents the Shuttle from launching through 
or near anvil clouds based on specialized 
weather models, time duration since the last 
electrical discharge from the cloud, and the 
size and temperature of the cloud.
4) Debris Clouds – The Debris Clouds rule 
prevents the Shuttle from launching through 
or near debris clouds depending on the 
distance of the cloud from a working field 
mill, the field strengths reported by the field 
mill, and the time duration since the last 
electrical discharge from the cloud.
5) Disturbed Weather – The Disturbed Weather 
rule prevents the Shuttle from launching 
through or near non-transparent clouds that
a r e  p a r t  o f  a  w e a t h e r  d i s t u r b a n c e,
depending on the amount of precipitation 
contained in the cloud and the cloud’s radar 
image.
6) Thick Cloud Layers – The Thick Cloud 
Layers rule prevents the Shutt le from 
launching through or near thick cloud layers 
depend ing  on  t he  t empera tu re  and  
precipitation content of the cloud layers.
7) Smoke Plumes – The Smoke Plumes rule 
prevents the Shuttle from launching through 
a cumulus cloud that has developed from a 
smoke plume if the cloud is still attached to 
the plume or has recently separated from 
the plume.
8) Surface Electric Fields – The Surface 
Electric Fields rule prevents the Shuttle from 
launching within 15 minutes of a nearby field 
mil measurement that violates the absolute 
value magnitude criteria.  This is dependent 
on the distance of the field mil from the flight 
path of the vehicle and the distance of 
nontransparent clouds from the flight path of 
the vehicle.
While the lightning LCC’s severely impact the 
Shuttle’s launch probability,[9] they are necessary to 
ensure vehicle and crew safety since a direct 
lightning attachment would likely cause catastrophic 
damage to the vehicle.  Since the inception of the 
lighting LCCs at the dawn of the Shuttle Program, no 
triggered lightning events have occurred during the 
launch phase of the Shuttle. [10]
LAUNCH COMPLEX LIGHTNING PROTECTION
AND DETECTION
In addition to the LCC’s that were developed to 
avoid lightning during the Shuttle’s launch phase, 
there are also features of Launch Complex 39 (LC-
39) to mitigate the effects of lightning to the vehicle 
during ground operations.  LC-39 has structures 
designed to protect the vehicle from the direct 
effects of lightning and instrumentation designed to 
qualify the risk to the vehicle due to the indirect 
effects of lightning.
The main structures that mitigate a direct lightning 
attachment to the Shuttle are the Fixed Service 
3Structure (FSS), the Rotating Service Structure 
(RSS), and the Catenary Wire System (CWS).
The FSS is the main structure that services the 
vehicle during pre-launch operations.  Although 
lightning protection is not the primary purpose, at
approximately 200 ft tall, this structure provides 
significant shielding to the Shuttle from a direct 
lightning attachment.  
Attached to the top of the FSS is a 70 ft fiberglass 
mast which supports the CWS.  This System is the 
primary lightning protection system at the Shuttle 
launch complex.  The CWS is comprised of wire that 
run north-south from the top of the fiberglass mast to 
ground anchor points located 1000 ft away. It is 
used to direct lightning currents away from the 
vehicle in the event that the CWS or the FSS is 
struck by lightning.[10]
Also attached to the FSS is the RSS.  The RSS is 
moved in place to cover the Shuttle when it is on the 
launch pad, and is used primarily for servicing the 
vehicle and for payload operations.  The RSS, like 
the FSS, provides significant shielding to the vehicle 
while on the launch pad.
These structures, however, do not provide the 
Shuttle with 100% protection from the direct and 
indirect effects of lightning while on the launch pad.  
The CWS design employed a “Cone of Protection” 
large enough to encompass the entire volume of the 
vehicle; a predominant theory in 1970’s lightning 
protection.  Today‘s Rolling Ball theory suggests that 
the Shuttle is prone to being struck by lightning while 
on the pad once every 100 years.[10]
The main system that collects data used by 
engineers to qualify the risk to the vehicle from the 
indirect effects of lightning while on the pad is the 
Ground Lightning Monitoring System (GLMS).  The 
GLMS consists of the Catenary Wire Lightning 
Instrumentation System (CWLIS), the Lightning 
Induced Voltage Instrumentation System (LIVIS), 
Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) Magnetic Field 
Sensors, Orbiter Utility Outlet Panel Measurements, 
current and voltage measurements within the Mobile 
Launch Platform (MLP), and a magnetic field sensor 
located on the liquid oxygen tail servicing mast.[11]
The CWLIS monitors the catenary wires attached to 
the FSS by passing them through current probes 
which transmit data to remote digitizers.  The
collected lightning event data conveys peak current 
amplitude, wave shape, and time stamping.
The LIVIS consists of eight instrumentation channels 
which monitor voltage and current transients on the 
Shuttle and transmit data to digitizers located in the 
MLP.  The collected data includes the wave shape, 
time stamping, and peak amplitude of the transient.  
Unlike the CWLIS, which continuously collects data, 
LIVIS is turned on just before the Shuttle departs the 
Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) for the launch pad.
The NRL sensors consist of a three-axis search coil, 
an optics head, and an avionics box.  The optic head 
converts the electrical signals from the search coil 
into a differential f iber-optic signal which is 
transmitted to the avionics box located in the pad 
terminal connection room.  There are two coils 
installed in the Space Shuttle Orbiter at the pad, one 
on the aft flight deck and one on the mid-deck.  An 
additional coil is installed on the FSS at the 195 ft
level and one is installed in the RSS in the payload 
change-out room (PCR).  All of these sensors are 
removed during a planned hold at 11 minutes 
remaining in the countdown.[11]
The Shuttle lightning detection systems are only 
able to provide qualitative data.  This is due to two 
primary factors:   1) not all Shuttle avionics have 
been tested to determine their susceptibilities to 
lightning-induced transients and 2) the transfer 
function that correlates the data reported by the 
lightning detection systems to avionics susceptibility 
levels is undefined.
Though imperfect, the lightning detection systems 
and lightning protection systems of the Shuttle 
launch complex have succeeded in minimizing the 
effects of lightning to the vehicle.  They also provide
useful data to qualify the risk to the vehicle due to 
the indirect effects of a lightning event.[10]
DEVELOPMENT OF NSTS 07636
Early in the Space Shuttle development, NASA 
convened a panel of lightning phenomena and test 
specialist to develop standard lightning environment 
and design requirements for the Space Shuttle 
Program.  This standard, NSTS 07636, released in 
1973, and the activities associated with its 
development significantly influenced later SAE 
activities.  
NSTS 07636 defined a lightning environment that 
differs from current SAE standards, but the peak 
amplitude, total charge transfer, and other critical 
aspects are similar.[1]
The early version of NSTS 07636 placed emphasis 
on design guidelines and less emphasis on test 
methods.  This document, and its companion, JSC 
20007, Shuttle Lightning Verification Document, 
emphasized protection against lightning indirect 
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control levels (TCLs) and equipment transient 
design lev e l s  ( E T D L s ) .   T h i s  T C L / E D T L  
development is widely used in aircraft and avionics 
equipment design.[1]
SPACE SHUTTLE LIGHTNING WAIVERS
The comprehensive lightning protection program 
defined in NSTS 07636 which included Shuttle 
lightning design criteria and requirements has since
been reduced to a mere historical document due to 
the large number of waivers.  
In some cases, the Shuttle Program granted waivers 
because the requirements were not compatible with 
the vehicle’s architecture.  For example, the thermal 
protection system (TPS) on the external tank (ET) is 
comprised of insulating foam which must remain
intact during flight. This foam is sprayed onto the 
exterior of the ET. It cannot be certified for lightning 
because a lightning direct attachment to the ET 
could cause foam loss.  If the insulation were
located on the interior of the tank, then this issue 
could have been avoided.  
In other cases, waivers were granted when minimal 
additional engineering rigor would have met the 
lightning requirements.  For example, the Space 
Shuttle Orbiter is exempt from the lightning indirect 
effects requirements.  In some cases, the Orbiter 
structure is the avionics current return path.  
Alternately, the Reusable Solid Rocket Booster 
(RSRB) current returns are dedicated cables 
isolated from structure.  From an architecture 
standpoint, this means the RSRB is much more 
capable of meeting the lightning indirect effects 
requirements contained in NSTS 07636.  
Unfortunately, a waiver was granted when the 
Program chose not to perform lightning qualification 
testing.
The extent of the waivers granted for NSTS 07636 
lightning requirements was so widespread that 
upgrades to the few non-compliant subsystems 
could not meet the direct and indirect effects of 
lightning requirements.  This turned the Shuttle 
Program’s view of lightning from that of designing for 
immunity to avoidance.
DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTELLATION 
LIGHTNING REQUIREMENTS
  
During the 1970s, NASA participated with the United 
States (US) Department of Transportation Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) in the development of 
requirements for lightning protection for US aircraft.  
The NASA Reference Publication 1008 was 
released in 1977,[13] and a revised version of this 
document was subsequently adopted by the FAA as 
DOT/FAA/CT-89/22, for use in developing lightning 
protection in the US aircraft industry.[25]  The SAE
carried this evolution further, first in the initial 
iteration of lightning requirements released  in SAE 
AE4L-78 (June 1978) [26] and later in the 
Aerospace Recommended Practice (ARP) 54xx 
series of documents which originated, in varying 
degrees, from concepts developed in previous
Space Shuttle lightning requirements.
Today ,  use  o f  t he  l i gh tn ing  requ i remen ts  
documented in the SAE ARP series is referenced by 
the FAA for US commercial aircraft design, and in 
MIL-STD-464A for US military aircraft design.[16] US
Federal regulation CFR 25.1309 requires that 
failures of systems performing critical functions (i.e.,
required for continued safe flight and landing) are
shown to be "extremely improbable",[14] defined in 
the FAA System Safety Handbook as a probability of 
occurring less than 1 x 10-9 times  per operational 
flight hour.[15]  
The Constellation Program is a multi-year, multi-
mission "system of systems" that calls for a robust, 
high-reliability infrastructure geared to safety and 
m i s s i o n  s u c c e s s  a s  t h e  primary design 
consideration.  Accordingly, Constellation 
requirements call for a system capable of meeting 
operational mission requirements in 95% of all 
weather conditions, including operating successfully 
during and following the direct and indirect effects of 
lightning.[5]  In  o rder  to  es tab l i sh  such  an  
operational posture against the lightning natural 
environment, the Constellation Program has likewise 
looked to the same standards as the FAA and the 
US mi l i ta ry  organ iza t ions ,  inc lud ing those 
documents maintained by the FAA, the SAE, and 
the RTCA.  
C o n s t e l l a t i o n  l i g h t n i n g  r e q u i r e m e n t s  a r e  
documented in the NASA Design Specification for 
Natural Environments, and define the natural 
lightning environment as that given in SAE ARP 
ARP5412A, "Aircraft Lightning Environment and 
Related Test Waveforms."[17] Lightning zoning of 
Constellation vehicles is to be carried out in 
accordance with the definitions and provisions found 
in SAE ARP5414A, "Aircraft Lightning Zoning."[19]  
The Constellation Program requires that SAE 
ARP5577, "Aircraf t  L ightning Direct  Ef fects 
Certification," should be used as a guide in 
developing systems to meet lightning direct effects 
requirements,[24] with failure condition 
classifications (e.g., catastrophic, hazardous/severe-
5major, major) defined in SAE ARP5413, 
"Certification of Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems 
for the Indirect Effects of Lightning" (obsolete, 
replaced by FAA AC 20-136A, December 2006).[18, 
23]  
Constellation also looks to SAE ARP5413 as a guide 
to attaining compliance with the lightning indirect 
effects protection and verification requirements.[18]  
SAE ARP5416, "Aircraft Lightning Test Methods," is 
referenced to provide methods for indirect effects 
verification testing of Constellation systems,[22] and 
RTCA/DO-160E, "Environmental Conditions and 
Test Procedures for Airborne Equipment," is given 
as a reference to provide methods for lightning-
induced transient testing of vehicle avionics 
equipment.[20]
Lightning indirect ef fects transient levels in 
Constellation systems are to be determined by test 
and analysis using methods found in SAE 
ARP5415A, "User’s Manual for Certification of 
Aircraft Electrical/Electronic Systems for the Indirect 
Effects of Lightning,"[21] and SAE ARP5416.  
Analysis may be performed in those cases where 
testing is impractical.[3, 22] 
ARES I LIGHTNING PROTECTION DESIGN
The Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (Ares I) will be 
designed to withstand the direct and indirect effects 
of a lightning strike to the vehicle itself, or to nearby 
objects, before or during launch and ascent 
operations.  The various elements of the vehicle will 
also be similarly protected during transportation and 
storage.  Ares I lightning protection will consider the 
lightning natural environment's interaction with the 
vehicle, the most likely lightning strike current 
entrance and exit points, and the resultant 
electromagnetic environment at various locations on 
and within the vehicle, to minimize lightning effects 
on the vehicle structure and to flight equipment.  
  
A t  t h e  l a u n c h  p a d ,  t h e  n a t u r a l  l i g h t n i n g  
environment's direct effects will be mitigated by a 
surrounding structure of elevated catenary wires and 
supporting towers to provide a means of intercepting 
a large majority of higher-amplitude lightning strikes.  
In pre-launch operational mission modes, however, 
the presence of surrounding structure, connected 
umbilical cables, and open access hatches and 
doors, will compromise and degrade the vehicle's 
own lightning protection measures that are designed 
to address indirect lightning effects sustained during 
flight.  An on-board transient monitoring will system 
capture and display the level of transients induced in 
the vehicle's avionics by a nearby lightning event, 
and provide a post-event basis for decisions to re-
test or replace on-board equipment that may have 
been damaged.
The physical  ef fects of  direct lightning arc 
attachment may impact the Ares I Upper Stage, First 
Stage, the Upper Stage Engine, and associated 
individual structural vehicle elements (fairings, 
ramps, struts, straps, etc.).
Lightning indirect effects protection designs will 
protect Ares I avionics subsystems and components 
against catastrophic, hazardous/severe-major, or 
major failures, as described in SAE ARP5413,[18]
when subjected to direct lightning attachment 
environments as described in SAE ARP5412A.[17]
Elements of the Ares I vehicle will be analyzed to 
determine the lightning attachment zones using: (1) 
the attachment zone definitions, (2) the zone 
location process, and (3) the initial leader 
attachment location methods, as found in SAE 
ARP5414A.[19]  The Ares I vehicle's outer skin will 
be fabricated of sufficient physical thickness and 
electrical conductivity to safely withstand without 
damage the blasting and heating effects of  a  
lightning strike at and along paths between the strike 
attachment entry and exit points.  Low-impedance 
electrical bonding at all structural joints of the 
conductive outer skin will provide an adequate path 
to carry the lightning strike current predominantly on 
the outside of the vehicle.  Sensitive avionics 
equipment, propulsion subsystems, and pyrotechnic 
devices will be protected by being enclosed within 
the vehicle's conductive outer skin, to the extent 
possible consistent with Ares I design constraints.  
Apertures in the vehicle's outer skin, of sufficient 
size to allow the passage of electromagnetic fields 
into the vehicle interior, will be minimized.[12]
Pro tec t ion  aga ins t  i nd i rec t  e f fec ts  w i l l  be  
accomplished primarily through shielding of electrical 
components and interconnecting wiring/cables to 
reduce the coupling of lightning currents or induced 
electromagnetic fields into electrical circuitry.  
Electrical wiring will be routed closely adjacent to 
vehicle structural components inside the protective 
vehicle skin wherever possible. If any cable must be 
routed outside the primary vehicle outer skin, it will 
be located inside a protective cabling tunnel with 
continuous, electrically bonded, conductive covers 
that shield the cabling conductors from lightning 
effects.  In addition, any wiring or cable routed 
outside the vehicle in this manner may be enclosed 
by an overall shield that is grounded with a 360° 
shield termination to the vehicle structure at every 
entrance or exit point along the vehicle skin, to 
provide additional indirect effects protection.[12]
6The environment induced by lightning in the Ares I 
vehicle is defined to be the Actual Transient Level 
(ATL) per SAE ARP5413.[18] An additional 
Equipment Transient Design Level (ETDL) level will 
be defined for Ares I avionics.  The ETDL is a 
transient level elevated by a 6 dB performance 
margin above the previously-determined ATL. 
ETDLs will be defined using the standardized 
induced transient waveform parameters shown in 
SAE ARP-5412A.[17]   ETDLs established for Ares I 
av ionics equipment  i tems,  wi l l  be stated in  
equipment specifications and will constitute 
qualification test levels for these items.  The Ares I 
equipment must continue to function normally, 
meeting all performance requirements, during and 
following exposure to the ETDL transient.
Ares I flight vehicle lightning protection requirements 
verification will be accomplished by qualification 
tests, analyses based on developmental test data, 
assessment of previously verified designs, or a 
combination of these methods. Verification will 
demonstrate that all lightning protection design 
requirements have been met for Ares I systems, 
subsystems, and/or components whose failure is 
designated as catastrophic, hazardous/severe-
major, or major.  A lightning protection verification 
plan (LPVP) will identify verification criteria that will 
be used to demonstrate that the Ares I systems, 
subsystems, and components have sat isf ied 
lightning protection requirements.  Verification 
criteria will include discussion of design margins and 
pass/fail rationale. The LPVP will include information 
documented in a Lightning Protection Survey and 
will also include the verification test/analysis data 
and methods to be employed, as well as success 
criteria of each subsystem/component test.[12]  
Finally, a verification test report as described in 
SAE-ARP-5416 will be developed to show the 
results of analyses and tests used to verify the 
adequacy of lightning protection designs and to 
show compliance with requirements for protection 
against direct and indirect lightning effects.[22]
LIGHTNING TRANSIENT MONITORING
Lightning protection measures are designed to be 
most effective during flight mission modes and may 
be compromised by certain activities and physical 
attachments to the flight vehicle during ground 
operations.
Ground operations support facilities should be able 
to determine the levels of transient activity induced 
in vehicle avionics wiring and cables, due to a direct 
or nearby lightning event.  Such a monitoring 
function must have a high-bandwidth capability and 
necessarily be of light weight and low physical 
volume to minimize additional lift-off impacts to the 
flight vehicle.  The monitoring system must be able 
to function during times when the vehicle is not 
powered, in order to capture transient activity, for 
example, during cross-country transportation or 
other similar ground operations when the 
Constellation assets are not connected at the launch 
pad facilities. 
Even nearby lightning events can cause impacts to 
the flight vehicle or spacecraft when these assets 
are not in a flight operations mode.  A nearby strike 
is considered to be any event within 0.5 nautical 
miles that is not judged to be a direct strike to the 
vehicle. At the launch pad, this 0.5 nmi radius 
includes launch pad support structures and towers.  
The risk of significant induced effects in the flight 
vehicle is high, if one of these elements (even one of 
the protective structures themselves) sustains a 
direct lightning strike attachment.
Without a method of determining a transient level in 
the vehicle avionics, and comparing this to previous 
qualification test levels that verified the vehicle's 
avionics as ready for flight, any lightning event 
(direct or nearby) may raise suspicions that the 
vehicle remains safe to fly.  This posture may result 
in unneeded avionics re-test or remove-and-replace 
operations because they may require that the entire 
flight vehicle be moved back into the VAB, a costly 
and time-consuming process.  Past experience has 
shown that a retest of flight vehicle avionics can take 
many hours, and a roll-back to vehicle assembly 
facilities, i f  n e e d e d  f o r  d e-stack/retest/re-stack 
operations, can require days of additional time and 
associated launch delays.  Clearly, the use of an on-
board transient monitoring system to provide data 
that leads to an unambiguous understanding of the 
vehicle's avionics health will result in improved and 
cost-effective pre-launch operations and a more 
robust Constellation mission operations scenario.
In order to protect against loss of mission or loss of 
life, an effective lightning protection program must 
be implemented. Because the Constellation 
Program has imposed high-percentage launch 
availability and long-term on-pad requirements, the 
lightning avoidance approach employed by the 
Space Shuttl e  P r o g r a m  i s  n o t  f e a s i b l e .  A  
Constellation Program lightning program, built on 
Space Shuttle Program lessons learned and 
adherence to industry standards, can achieve a 
robust vehicle design that is immune to the direct 
and indirect effects of lightning.
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